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Abstract
The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select
a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits (rent) to
specic groups. In most circumstances, these decisions are often politically con-
tentious and frequently inuenced by rent seeking behaviour. In this paper, we use
a contest model to analyse the e¤ects of rent seeking e¤ort when permits are freely
distributed (grandfathered). Rent seeking behaviour can inuence both the share
of permits which an individual rm receives and also the total supply of permits.
This latter impact depends on the responsiveness of the regulator to aggregate rent
seeking e¤ort. Using a three-stage game, we show that rent seeking can inuence
both the distribution of rents and the ex post value of these rents, whilst welfare
usually decreases in the responsiveness of the regulator.
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1 Introduction
Tradable pollution markets have become an increasingly mainstream regulatory tool for
controlling pollution. Since Montgomery (1972), economists have known that under cer-
tain conditions, such markets can achieve an e¢ cient (that is, cost-minimising) allocation
of pollution control e¤orts across polluters, irrespective of the initial allocation of permits
by a regulator. This is because post-allocation trading will allow all potential gains from
trades to be realised. However, the initial allocation of permits has become a matter of
both political debate and increasing academic interest, since rmsgains and losses can
in the real world depend partly on this initial allocation. Moreover, since permits are
valuable, allocation creates rents over which rms can be expected to compete ex ante
by rent seeking. In many existing tradable permit markets, regulators decisions over
the distribution and absolute level of emissions have often been inuenced by interested
parties (see, for example, Svendsen (2005)).1 This lobbying for rents is typically seen as
socially unproductive and often as a signicant and sustained problem.
An important question for economists is how rent seeking strategies are determined
in tradable permit markets, how this inuences social welfare, and whether these e¤ects
depend on the degree to which a regulator allows rent seeking to determine both the
distribution and absolute level of these rents. This paper seeks to answer this question,
using a contest model. Our conclusion is that when regulators are responsive to aggregate
rent seeking (i.e. are willing to change the total supply of permits) then rent seeking
strategies for tradable permits di¤er signicantly from standard (non-tradable) rents.
This is a direct result of rms having the ability to trade pollution permits following
on from an initial allocation, which produces an equilibrium price e¤ect. When the
regulators responsiveness to aggregate rent seeking increases we nd this results in an
ambiguous change in welfare, which is dependent on the trade-o¤ between the increase
in aggregate emissions and any decrease in rent seeking from a reduction in the permit
1Anecdotal evidence exists for the existence of lobbying (from individual senators) in the US SO2
trading scheme (Ellerman et al. 2000) and under the Waxman-MarkeyBill (HR. 2454). In the set up
of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), industry was heavily involved in lobbying
behaviour (Svendsen, 2005; Ellerman et al. 2007).
value. This suggests that no simple answers are available in an actual policy context to
how governments should respond to opportunities for rent seeking over tradable permits:
a surprising result.
In this paper we use a contest framework to analyse rent seeking. Starting from
the seminal works of Krueger (1974), Posner (1975) and Tullock (1980), a substantial
body of work has focused on rent dissipation issues, where the total rents available for
capture across all agents are taken as xed (for surveys of the literature, see Nitzan,
1994; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Congleton et al., 2008; Konrad, 2009). Chung (1996)
extends a Tullock-style rent seeking contest model to include a rent that is endogenously
determined by aggregate e¤orts and nds that the extended contest generates excessive
e¤ort levels which are socially wasteful. More recently, Sha¤er (2006) nds that e¤ort
levels tend to adjust in the direction of the change in the rent. For example, when the
lobbying is "productive" (where the rent is increasing in aggregate e¤orts), agents tend to
invest more e¤ort in rent seeking. However, this literature typically assumes that rents are
non-tradable, which limits the insights one can draw when considering tradable pollution
permit markets. In our analysis, we allow the total value of rents to be endogenously
determined by aggregate rent seeking e¤ort, extending this to both the quantity (total
supply of permits) and price (ex-post value of traded permits) dimensions.
A tradable permit market involves an ex post reallocation of rents. It has long been
understood that such an ex post reallocation of emission rights is key to an e¢ cient alloca-
tion of emission reductions among polluters (Montgomery, 1972). Few authors, however,
have considered rent seeking contests when ex post reallocation is not just possible but
essential to the operation of the policy instrument. Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) and Sui
(2009) nd that although contests are allocatively e¢ cient, e¤ort levels tend to increase
when ex post reallocation is permitted. However, it is not clear how these rents di¤er from
standard rents in terms of agentsrent seeking strategies and regulatory responses. In the
context of tradable pollution permit markets, Lai (2008) has investigated the social welfare
consequences of rms and environmental groups lobbying over the determination of an
aggregate emissions cap and nds allocating freely may be more e¢ cient than auctioning.
However, the incentives for rms to rent-seek for their own private benet (to increase
their own individual share of permits at the expense of rival rms) are not considered by
Lai.
In the contest modelled herein, polluting rms have the option to invest in rent seeking
e¤ort that has the potential to increase their own permit allocation within a tradable
permit market and, simultaneously, the aggregate supply of permits from the regulator
(i.e. political pressure to increase individual and aggregate level emissions). We allow the
regulator to select a provisional aggregate emissions target (for example, by announcing
draft legislation) which can be subsequently inuenced by rmsrent seeking e¤ort. We
provide cases where the regulator views rent seeking as purely socially wasteful and,
alternatively, where the regulator obtains political contributions from rent seekers. This is
a partial way of modelling variations in the qualityof regulation, which might be thought
important from a political economy stand-point. The responsiveness of the regulator can
also be viewed as representing regulator quality. Our focus is on how the market value
of the ex post reallocated rent, which is endogenously determined by the marginal costs
of participating rms and the aggregate supply of permits (which may be determined by
rent seeking itself), alters rent seeking behaviour and social welfare. We nd di¤erences in
rmsrent seeking choices compared to a conventional contest. We see that a fundamental
aspect of rmsincentives to rent-seek depends on the market value of the permits, that
is, the value of the ex post reallocated rents.
This paper focuses on rent seeking for tradable pollution permits, however, the ra-
tionale can directly apply to more general contests where the prize won has the ability
of being ex post reallocated. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. In Section 3, the rms optimal choice of emissions is determined. In Section 4, the
rms equilibrium rent seeking strategy is discussed and aggregate rent seeking e¤ort is
then derived. Section 5 investigates the regulators optimal choice of aggregate emissions
and discusses whether alternative responses to rent seeking can be welfare improving.
Section 6 provides a discussion of policy implications and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a set of rms f1; 2; : : : ; ng that participate in a competitive tradable pollution
permit market. In this market, permits are initially allocated freely but each rm has
the ability to alter the amount of permits it receives from the regulator by investing in
rent seeking e¤ort denoted by si for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.2 A unilateral increase in rm is rent
seeking investment will result in that rm obtaining relatively more permits prior to the
beginning of the market. Additionally, we allow for the possibility that aggregate rent
seeking e¤ort inuences the regulators nal decision when selecting an absolute level for
the aggregate emissions cap. That is, market participants can apply political pressure on
the regulator to increase the aggregate emissions level.3 Therefore, an increase in rent
seeking by rm i increases their share of the "pie" and provides pressure to increase the
absolute size of the "pie". After the initial distribution of the rents, rms are free to trade
and reallocate these permits.
Our model is split into three stages. In stage one, the regulator selects a provisional
level of aggregate emissions for the trading permit market denoted by ~A (such as draft
legislation). In stage two, given this information, each rm invests in rent seeking e¤ort
si 8 i to obtain a share of the aggregate emissions which results in a "nal" aggregate
allocation for the permit market denoted by A.4 In stage three, the market commences
2Our results are qualitatively similar when one considers a hybrid allocation approach where both
auctioning and grandfathering can be used (where the rent now available for rent seekers is simply the total
allocation minus the permits allocated from the auction). This approach has been advocated by energy
companies for the forthcoming US wide cap-and-trade program (Point Carbon, 2009). Furthermore,
our results may provide analysis on how rms rent seek for permits where allocation mechanisms use
"reserves", energy intensity targets and "safety valves" prior to the beginning of the scheme (Pizer, 2002;
Newell et al., 2005). To introduce full auctioning of permits, the distribution of permits can be modelled
as a multi-unit auction (see, Krishna, 2002). In this case, rent seeking inuences the aggregate level of
emissions but not the distribution of permits.
3Importantly, this does not require cooperation between market participants. Each participant rent-
seeks in order to obtain a permit allocation for themselves. It is only as a result of this accumulated
rent-seeking activity that provides pressure on the regulator to increase the aggregate emissions.
4As our focus is on the distributional impact of permit allocation and the subsequent a¤ect on the
tradable permit market and social welfare, we assume that regulated rms are the only rent seeking agents.
This is conceivable when a draft legislation has been determined and the associated permit allocation is
contestable, for example, one could interpret the political activity under the Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R.
2454) or the lobbying surrounding the National allocation Plans (NAPs) in the EU-ETS as similar to our
three-stage game. Environmental groups may also invest in rent seeking activity in order to inuence
the aggregate target, however, they would not participate in rent seeking for permit distribution. The
determination of environmental policy under political inuence from interest groups has been widely
analysed. For surveys, see, for example, Keohane et al. (1998), Oates and Portney (2003) and Stavins
and each rm selects a level of pollution to emit in the market.
To model how the provisional aggregate emissions level in stage one di¤ers from the
nal emissions level in stage two, we introduce an exogenous political "responsiveness"
parameter  2 [0; ) which is common knowledge among all rms and the regulator.5
The political responsiveness parameter  represents the political, cultural and governance
relationships between the regulator and regulated rms. When  = 0 the regulator is
unresponsive to aggregate rent seeking and the resulting aggregate emissions cap is simply
the provisional aggregate emissions chosen by the regulator ~A. An upper bound on  will
exist where the responsiveness is su¢ ciently large to reduce the equilibrium permit price
to zero. Typically, we may expect  to be small, where an increase in rent seeking is
smaller than the resulting increase in aggregate emissions. For  > 0, the regulator is
responsive to rmsrent seeking e¤orts. Formally, the nal aggregate emissions cap A set
by the regulator is determined by
A = ~A 
 
1 + 
nX
i=1
si
!
(1)
where the nal rent available in the contest is endogenously determined by the regulators
initial draft legislation ~A and aggregate rent seeking e¤ort
Pn
i si. We follow a framework
similar to Helm (2003). To solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the
model using backward induction and as a result outline and solve stage three rst.
3 Stage three: rmschoice of equilibrium emissions
In stage three, the tradable permit market commences and rm i selects a level of emis-
sions. Assuming the equilibrium permit price p and the level of allocation a0i obtained in
stage two is taken as given (and hence the aggregate allocation A nalised in stage two),
(2004).
5The political responsiveness parameter represents the a¤ect of aggregate rent-seeking e¤ort on the
regulators choice of emissions. Even for values of  = 0, rent-seeking e¤ort will continue to determine the
distribution among rms. Negative values of  can also be considered, however, this is less realistic for
the context of rent-seeking for pollution permits. As Sha¤er (2006) explains, allowing for  < 0 results
in a destructive contest where the rent decreases in aggregate rent-seeking e¤orts.
rm is payo¤ from the tradable permit market is:
max
ei
i = p
(a0i   ei)  ci(ei) for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (2)
where ei is the level of net emissions (inclusive of abatement choices) and ci(ei) is the
abatement cost function where c0i(ei)  0, c00i (ei)  0. The term (a0i   ei) shows rm is
net supply of permits to the market (which can also be negative). Given the levels of
allocation to each rm (and the subsequent equilibrium permit price determined by the
aggregate emissions), di¤erentiating (2) with respect to ei yields the following rst order
condition:
 p   c0i(ei) = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (3)
which is solved for ei and the market clearing condition is given by:
nX
i=1
ei = A (4)
The rst order condition (3) states the familiar result that each rm will choose a
level of emissions to equate their marginal abatement costs with the equilibrium permit
price. Condition (4) is the market clearing condition where, in equilibrium, the aggregate
emissions must equate to the aggregate supply of permits.
Di¤erentiating (3) with respect to p and (4) with respect to A we obtain:
 1  c00i (ei)
@ei
@p
= 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (5)
nX
i=1
@ei
@p
@p
@A
= 1 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (6)
where substitution yields:
@p
@A
=  
"
1Pn
i=1
1
c00i (ei)
#
< 0 (7)
Expression (7) shows that as the aggregate allocation increases, the equilibrium permit
price decreases. Note that the extent of this depreciation is based on the slope of rms
marginal abatement costs, where steeper marginal abatement costs result in a larger
change in the equilibrium permit price. As will be discussed later in the paper, the
relationship in (7) is the key to understanding how rent seeking for ex post reallocated
rents (such as pollution permits) di¤ers from standard rents.
4 Stage two: rmsoptimal rent seeking e¤ort
In this stage, rm i selects a level of rent seeking e¤ort to obtain an initial allocation of
permits for the beginning of the tradable permit market in stage three. Let us assume that
in stage one ~A0 was chosen by the regulator where each rm knows that the nal aggregate
emissions cap for the tradable permit market is determined by ~A0 (1 + 
Pn
i=1 si). This
rent seeking, from the view point of society, is unproductive. Formally, we represent the
allocation of permits to rm i by:
ai =
8><>: f(si; s i)A if
Pn
i=1 si > 0
~A
n
otherwise
for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (8)
where A is the aggregate emissions level given in (1) with ~A = ~A0 and the contest success
function is given by the conventional Tullock (1980) rent seeking model with constant
returns to rent seeking and linear costs:6
f(si; s i) =
si
si + s i
(9)
From (1), (8) and (9) observe that ai is increasing in si and decreasing in s i. As shown
above, rent seeking allows each rm to capture a share of the "pie" and simultaneously
increase the aggregate emissions cap.
6Throughout the paper we use the interpretation of a divisible prize among agents. However, provided
risk neutrality of the agents, a non-divisible rent, where there is a non-zero probability of winning, is
functionally equivalent. Therefore, the alternative interpretation of this model is where agents participate
in a contest for a single prize which can then be ex post reallocated after initial distribution.
4.1 Equilibrium e¤ort
We now consider the incentives to rent seek for a permit allocation that can be ex post
reallocated. Firms may invest in rent seeking e¤ort to not only inuence their own
allowance of permits but, from (1), the aggregate allocation. This means that the permit
price is endogenously determined by the level of aggregate allocation and hence the level
of aggregate rent seeking e¤ort.
Firm i now selects a level of rent seeking to maximise its payo¤:
max
si
p(ai   ei (A(si)))  si   ci(ei (A(si))) (10)
where ei (A) is the equilibrium level of emissions chosen in stage three, ai is given by (8)
and the cost of rent-seeking is given by si. Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to si and noting
from (3) that in the perfectly competitive market @ci
@ei
= p so that p @e

i
@si
= c0i(e

i (A(si)))
we obtain the following rst order condition:7
p
@ai
@si
+
@p
@A
@A
@si
(ai   ei )  1 = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n (11)
where
@ai
@si
= f 0(si; s i)A(s) + f(si; s i)A0(s) (12)
To begin our discussion on rent seeking strategies under ex post reallocation, note that
(11) illustrates two important marginal e¤ects on rm is rent seeking e¤ort. The rst
term in (11) shows a positive marginal e¤ect where a unilateral increase in rm is rent
seeking will increase its permit allocation and wealth, given the permit price p. From
(12) one can see, from the rst term, that this positive marginal inuence is based on
the marginal increase in rm is share of permits (given a xed allocation) and, from
the second term, a marginal increase in permits from an increase in the aggregate cap
(given a constant share of permits). The e¤ect of the second term in (11) is ambiguous
and directly related to ex post reallocation. As will be discussed further below, when
7The second order conditions are satised for su¢ ciently small (absolute) values of @
2p
@A2 . We assume
throughout that the second order conditions are satised at the optimal levels.
rent seeking increases this may increase the aggregate emissions cap and decrease the
equilibrium permit price. This is a positive marginal e¤ect when the rm is an ex post
net buyer of permits (i.e. ai   ei < 0), as permits now become cheaper to purchase.
However, if the rm is an ex post net seller of permits (i.e. ai   ei > 0) this marginal
e¤ect is negative as the additional permits sold are now sold at a lower price. It follows
from (11) that net buyers of permits tend to invest more in rent seeking than net sellers
of permits. This result shows that allowing ex post reallocation in the form of a tradable
permit market for rents creates a situation where equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort is now
dependent on equilibrium rents held.
4.2 Aggregate rent seeking e¤ort
Our main focus in this paper is aggregate rent seeking e¤ort and how this is a¤ected
by the regulation of pollution under a tradable permit market. To nd aggregate rent
seeking, (11) is summed over all n rms which is simplied a result of the market clearing
condition (4) where, in equilibrium, the aggregate supply of permit will equal the aggregate
emissions. Thus the rst order conditions becomes:
p
nX
i=1
@ai
@si
  n = 0 (13)
From (13), the interior equilibrium solution exists when the aggregate marginal cost is
equal to the marginal aggregate benet of rent seeking. We assume for tractability a
symmetric equilibrium s = si = s i. This assumption is less restrictive than may rst
appear as the incentive e¤ects on rent seeking from the net demand (supply) or permits
are eliminated under aggregation. Therefore (13) is driven solely by the aggregation of
the marginal benets and costs where a symmetric solution provides the fundamental
elements for the regulated market.8 Solving (13), yields the aggregate equilibrium rent
8This approach is common when considering aggregate e¤ects in tradable permit markets. For ex-
ample, Newell and Pizer (2003) and Fell et al. (2008) use a representative agent approach to estimate
expected costs of climate change from alternative mechanisms.
seeking e¤ort for regulated rms:
S = p
(n  1)
n
~A0
1  p ~A0 (14)
for p ~A0 < 1 ( = 1
p ~A0 ) where the marginal increase in value of the ex post reallocated
rent p ~A0 is lower than the marginal cost of rent seeking, otherwise agents would choose
the maximum possible level of resource-seeking. The major distinction between standard
rent-seeking approaches and our ex post reallocation rent seeking strategy is that the
equilibrium permit price now determines the market value for the ex post reallocation
rent.
Di¤erentiating the aggregate rent seeking strategy (14) with respect to the regulators
optimal allocation choice, reveals, after some manipulation:
@S
@ ~A0
=
(n  1)
n
p
[1 + "p]
1  p ~A0
2 (15)
where "p =
@p
@ ~A0
~A0
p is the elasticity of the equilibrium price level based on a change in the
regulators aggregate allocation choice.9 In standard rents, @S

@ ~A0
is unambiguously positive
as the increase in rent increases wealth. However, from (15), we see that the size of "p will
determine whether @S

@ ~A0
is positive or negative. Importantly, we nd increasing the total
supply of permits has an ambiguous e¤ect on rent seeking. This is in direct contrast to
frameworks that investigate standard rents (Sha¤er, 2006).
5 Stage one: regulators optimal choice of aggregate
emissions
In stage one, the regulator will select a level of aggregate emissions ~A. As a consequence
the resulting aggregate emissions level will be determined by expression (1) so that A =
~A (1 + 
Pn
i=1 s

i ) where
Pn
i=1 s

i are the aggregate rent seeking e¤orts from stage two.
9Note this is the inverse of a standard price elasticity of demand.
Let us initially assume that the regulator, such as the US EPA, is solely concerned about
maximising social welfare in that region. We return to the case where the regulator is
concerned about the attainment of political contributions at the end of this section.
5.1 The regulators optimal choice of aggregate emissions
The regulators aim is to maximise the net welfare W which consists of rmsnet prots
from the tradable permit market
Pn
i=1i(A) minus the damage from the emissions and
the cost of the (socially unproductive) rent seeking e¤ort. More formally, the regulators
objective function is:
max
~A
W =
nX
i=1
i(A) D(A)  S (16)
where D(A) is the damage caused by emissions where D0(A); D00(A)  0 and S is the
aggregate rent seeking cost from all rms participating in the tradable permit market.
Using backward induction, the regulator knows equilibrium rent seeking e¤ort by
observing (14) that occurs in stage two according to a given level of  and A. In order to
show the regulators optimal choice of allocation, it is important to compare this result to
the socially optimal case when there exists no rent seeking e¤ort. That is, what aggregate
allocation level would the regulator choose under the presence of zero rent seeking? As
shown in Appendix A, when zero rent seeking occurs the regulator selects an aggregate
emissions cap so that:
p =
@D(A)
@A
(17)
which is optimally solved for ~AB (here we have @A
@ ~A
= 1 hence @D(A)
@A
= @D(A)
@ ~A
). This states
that the regulator should set a level of aggregate emissions so that the marginal benet
(the equilibrium permit price) is equated to the marginal damage of emissions.
In order to solve for the regulators optimal aggregate allocation in (16), we rst sum
over all rmsprot functions which gives  Pni=1 ci(ei) and di¤erentiating with respect
to ~A yields:
 
nX
i=1
@ci
@e
@e
@A
@A
@ ~A
(18)
Using (3), this simplies to:
p
@A
@ ~A
nX
i=1
@ei
@A
(19)
and noting that @e

@A
= 1, this reduces to:
@
@ ~A
 
nX
i=1
i(A)
!
= p
@A
@ ~A
(20)
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to ~A and substituting in (20) yields the regulators
rst order condition:10
p
@A
@ ~A
  @S

@A
@A
@ ~A
 D0(A)@A
@ ~A
= 0 (21)
Therefore ~A is chosen so that (21) holds. Note there are three inuences on the
regulators optimal choice of allocation. First there is an upward inuence in the form
of marginal increase in rmsprot due to the increased aggregate allocation p @A
@ ~A
. Note
that @S

@A
@A
@ ~A
which is shown in (15) has an ambiguous inuence in terms of the marginal
change in optimal aggregate rent seeking e¤ort and nally a downward inuence due
to the additional damage produced. Furthermore, we obtain an expression that allows
analysis of the aggregate emissions level:
Lemma 1 In the presence of rent seeking e¤ort, the regulators optimal choice of aggre-
gate allocation ~A is chosen so that:
p =
@D(A)
@A
(22)
where  =
"
1  (n 1)
n
[1+"p]
1+S

1+
[1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

(1 p ~A)2
#
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Direct comparison of (17) and (22) show that aggregate emissions are only socially
optimal when  = 1, that is j"pj = 1, where the change in the equilibrium permit price is
equal to the change in the regulators choice of allocation.
10The second order conditions are satised for the optimal value given a su¢ ciently small (absolute)
@2S
@A2 .
To observe the inuence of "p on the regulators choice of aggregate emissions, let us
begin by analysing the case were the regulator is unresponsive to rent seeking  = 0.
Given  = 0, the regulators choice of allocation becomes:
p

1  (n  1)
n

1 + "0p

=
@D(A)
@A
which shows that for
"0p > 1, aggregate emissions are larger than socially optimal.
Emissions increase as the reduction in rent seeking is relatively larger than the increase
in damages from additional emissions. Similarly, when 1
n+1
<
"0p < 1, the change in
equilibrium price is relatively unresponsive so that any increase in emissions will increase
damages more than the benet from reduced rent seeking e¤ort.
For the case of a responsive regulator, the analysis is similar. Let us rst consider the
case when  > 1. Notice from Lemma 1 that  > 1 does not occur for j"pj < 1. That
is, if an inelastic "p occurs, the change (reduction) in rent seeking is small, therefore the
reduction in rent seeking does not outweigh the damages of additional emissions. Instead
let us concentrate on j"pj > 1. To ensure that  remains positive let us focus on elasticity
levels of the range 1 < j"pj < j"pj where j"pj is dened by:11
[1 + "p] =  

1  p ~A0

(n  1)p ~A0
h
n  p ~A0
i
< 0
Aggregate emissions are above the socially optimal (A > ~AB) level as a relative
responsiveness equilibrium permit price 1 < j"pj < j"pj, results in relatively larger rent
seeking reductions. Counter-intuitively, it is not the actual rent seeking that increases the
aggregate emissions but the reduction in social costs associated with a reduction in rent
seeking that allows the regulator to issue additional permits.
Finally, consider  2 (0; 1). In order to do this, we have to dene the limits of "p.
Firstly, we can dene a lower bound of j"pj for which  > 0. This occurs when j"pj >
"Tp 
11For j"pj > j"pj,  still may be positive but result in a lower aggregate allocation than socially optimal.
In this case, the price is extremely sensitive, so much so that, the regulators optimal choice of aggregate
emissions is chosen below the socially optimal level.
where "Tp is determined by:

1 + "Tp

=
n
n 1

1  p ~A
2
(1 + S)
1  n
n 1

1  p ~A

S
Similarly, we can dene the lower bound by "^p is determined by:
[1 + "^p] =
1 + S
1  S
1 p ~A0
When j"^pj > j"pj >
"Tp , the inelastic price changes are not enough to outweigh the
increase in damages. As a result, actual aggregate emissions tend to be smaller than
socially optimal as the regulator takes this into account and reduces the amount of permits
available (A < ~AB).
5.2 Regulatory responsiveness and welfare
From above, we were able to show that the regulators optimal choice of allocation depends
on how responsive the equilibrium permit price is to changing allocations. Another type of
responsiveness is that of the regulator towards the setting of the initial allocation. Can a
change in regulatory responsiveness (i.e. a change in rent seeking culture) change welfare?
That is, given the optimal regulators decision determined in (22), how does changing the
responsiveness parameter  alter welfare for society?
Solving for dW
d
, shows how the regulators responsiveness alters welfare.
Proposition 1 The welfare change given by an increase in the regulators responsiveness
is:
dW
d
= [p  D0(A)] @A

@
  @S

@
Proof. See Appendix B.
From Proposition 1, two main factors determine whether increasing responsiveness
changes welfare. The rst term [p  D0(A)] @A
@
shows the distance away from the so-
cially optimally level of allocation which is derived in Lemma 1. Under a socially optimal
emissions cap, expression (17) shows that p   D0(A) = 0. However, Lemma 1 shows
that, in most cases this tends to be non-zero. In fact, when p   D0(A) < 0 emissions
are larger than socially optimal and tend to reduce welfare given a change in responsive-
ness (an additional increase in emissions away from the socially optimal level will reduce
welfare whereas when p D0(A) > 0 and an increase in responsiveness moves emissions
closer to the socially optimal level and improves welfare). Second, the marginal change
in rent seeking alters welfare.
Everything else constant, Proposition 1 shows that a reduction in rent seeking unam-
biguously improves welfare. This is not surprising as rent seeking is a socially unproduc-
tive activity. However, from Lemma 1 it is unclear as to the net e¤ect on welfare given a
change in responsiveness. Implicit di¤erentiation of (14) with respect to  reveals:
@S
@
=
S
p

1  p ~A
 @p
@
+ ~A0(p)2

(23)
In terms of changing rent seeking e¤ort, (23) shows that as regulatory responsiveness
increases, the change to social welfare is a¤ected by two opposing factors. Using the chain
rule we know @p

@
= @p

@A
@A
@
. Di¤erentiation of (1) with respect to  yields:
@A
@
= ~A 

S + 
@S
@

(24)
Substituting (24) into (23) and collecting @S

@
terms yields:
@S
@
=

@p
@AS
 + (p)2

p(1 p ~A)
S ~A    @p

@A
(25)
where @p

@A is given by (7). The denominator of (25) is always positive therefore the sign of
@S
@
is determined by

@p
@AS
 + (p)2

. The rst e¤ect @p

@AS
 we denote as the price e¤ect.
When responsiveness increases, the equilibrium price per unit of emissions decreases which
reduces socially wasteful rent seeking and improves welfare (net of damages associated
with increased emissions). This e¤ect is absent in standard rent seeking frameworks
and is due to the changing equilibrium permit price altering the value of the ex post
reallocated rent. Second, the wealth e¤ect (p)2 > 0 has a dampening a¤ect on social
welfare. Increased responsiveness results in a larger supply of permits distributed to rms
which increases rent seeking e¤ort and reduces social welfare. When the wealth e¤ect
dominates the price e¤ect, marginal rent seeking e¤ort is positive

@S
@
> 0

and this
reduces social welfare whereas when @p

@
+ ~A0(p)2 < 0 the price e¤ect dominates the
wealth e¤ect which results in negative marginal rent seeking activity

@S
@
< 0

and an
improve in social welfare.
5.3 The regulator and political contributions
Up to this point, we have considered a regulator that acts benevolently by selecting a level
of aggregate emissions to maximise social welfare where it views rent seeking as socially
wasteful. However, it is clear that regulators (politicians) may obtain a benet in the form
of political contributions which may alter the incentives to select the level of aggregate
emissions (Hillman, 1982; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In this subsection, we extend
our model by allowing the regulator to optimise the standard social welfare function with
the additional (weighted) political contribution benets.
To show this, let us assume that the regulator obtains political contributions from
rent seekers given by S where  > 0 is an exogenous parameter representing the extent
to which the regulator can attain political contributions from rent seekers. From the
regulators payo¤ function in (16) we know that the net gain from rent seeking is given
by (  1)S. When 0 <  < 1 the net benet from the political contributions is negative
and similar (but augmented) results are found to the case when the regulator attains
no political contributions. However when  > 1 the net benets of attaining political
contributions are positive and additional results exist. In particular, the regulators choice
of emissions is now determined by
p
26641 + (   1)(n  1)n [1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A
2
3775 = D0(A) (26)
In contrast to the previous case, the regulator has an incentive to increase emissions
when the elasticity "p (given a change in the allocation) is inelastic j"pj < 1. Intuitively,
as the price is unresponsive, an increase in emissions results in only a small decrease in
price and consequently rent seeking e¤ort continues to be relatively large which produces
a large amount of political contributions for the regulator. A similar analysis can also be
considered for j"pj > 1.
We can also analyse the e¤ect on the regulators payo¤ when there is a change in the
exogenous parameter . Unlike the case where there are no political contributions, we
nd a larger wealth e¤ect will improve the payo¤ of the regulator whereas a stronger price
e¤ect will result in a lower payo¤ for the regulator.
6 Discussion
In the majority of current tradable pollution permit markets, rent seeking behaviour is a
common occurrence. Both under the EU-ETS and U.S. legislation on climate change, such
as the Waxman-MarkeyBill (HR. 2454), signicant lobbying has been invested in order
to capture rents. Although rent seeking behaviour is socially wasteful, to what extent
does this behaviour a¤ect the consequences of implementing these schemes? This paper
has attempted to model incentives for rm and regulator behaviour in a tradable permit
market when lobbying can inuence the total supply of permits, their initial allocation
to individual rms, and where the value of each permit (and thus of rents) depends on
ex-post permit trading.
An important contribution of this paper is to show that the incentive to rent seek for
tradable pollution permit di¤ers from traditional rents. This is a result of the market
creating an equilibrium permit price which inuences the rent seeking incentives of rms
and the selection of aggregate emissions by the regulator. Therefore to draw meaningful
conclusions about the social welfare consequences of this type of rent seeking, one must
consider the e¤ects on aggregate emissions and the level of rent seeking. Two opposing
e¤ects determine impacts on social welfare. Increased responsiveness (or simply increases
in aggregate emissions) will create additional damages, however, the additional supply will
decrease the market clearing price and thus reduce the rent seeking activity. Counter-
intuitively, it is possible that a regulators increased responsiveness may actually improve
welfare. That is, the reduction in rent seeking creates larger benets that the additional
damages from increased emissions.
From (7) we can see that the change in the equilibrium permit price is based on the
slopes of rmsmarginal abatement cost functions. That is, relatively steeper marginal
abatement costs functions (i.e. each additional unit of abatement is relatively more ex-
pensive), result in a more responsive equilibrium permit price. Therefore, it follows that
in markets where rmsmarginal abatement cost functions are steep and rent seeking
is a signicant and costly problem, a regulator could increase welfare when regulatory
responsiveness exists. This suggests that a pay no attention to lobbyingrule would not
necessarily be the best choice for a regulator in an actual permit market.12
7 Conclusion
A contentious and demanding aspect of a regulators role in a tradable permit market
is the initial allocation of permits. In particular, the determination of the aggregate
emissions cap and the distribution of permits among participants remain controversial
issues. As with most valuable rents, a signicant amount of rent seeking e¤ort tends to
be employed in actual permit markets to inuence both the size and the distribution of
the rents. Yet in contrast to traditional contestable rents, tradable rents, such as tradable
pollution permits, allow for ex post reallocation. It is important to understand how this
alters agentsincentives to rent seek.
To do this, we introduce a contest where polluting rms in a tradable permit market
have the option to invest in rent seeking e¤ort that has the potential to increase (i) their
own permit allocation within the tradable permit market and (ii) the aggregate supply
of permits from the regulator (i.e. political pressure to increase the aggregate level of
12Steep marginal abatement cost may actually cause signicant amounts of rent-seeking as these rms
tend to nd investment in abatement relatively expensive and are more likely to consider investing in
rent-seeking as an alternative. Steeper marginal abatement costs may well characterise greenhouse gas
control policy in the near future as increasingly ambitious targets are set for emission reductions, and
simple, cheap abatement options get used up.
emissions). The regulator selects a provisional aggregate emissions target but this can
be inuenced by rms rent seeking e¤ort. We analyse two cases where the regulator
views rent seeking as purelysocially wasteful and where the regulator obtains political
contributions from rent seekers. We show the incentives behind rmsrent seeking e¤ort
in a tradable permit market and compare this to a standard rent seeking framework. We
nd individual rent seeking strategies depend on whether, in equilibrium, the rm is a net
buyer or seller of the ex post reallocated rent (initial allocation of permits). Regulators
optimal allocation choices are shown to depend on the responsiveness of price to changes
in allocations, whilst variations in the responsiveness of regulators to lobbying (shown
by the parameter ) are shown to have potentially positive or negative consequences for
social welfare.
The analysis presented here suggests that a regulator should try to understand the
likely e¤ects of rent seeking on the equilibrium permit price (and thus the value of the
ex post reallocated rent) and the social loss created by rent seeking. We show that
the equilibrium permit price e¤ect has the potential to decrease socially wasteful rent
seeking e¤ort and in some cases can improve welfare when the regulators responsiveness
to aggregate rent seeking actually increases a surprising result, in some senses. Allowing
ex post reallocation creates a price e¤ect that inuences the equilibrium levels of rent
seeking not seen in the traditional contestable rents story.
Due to the current political debate that surrounds the initial distribution of pollution
permits to regulated rms, this framework has focused solely on the rent seeking of pol-
luting rms. However, environmental groups also invest in rent seeking and often try and
inuence draft legislation. It is possible to extend this analysis to include rent seeking
of environmental groups to alter the initial choice of aggregate emissions that regulated
rms contest. Introducing this as well as the e¤ects of coordinated interest groups on
social welfare are left for future research. Moreover, it would be interested to consider a
dynamic version of the model where permit markets go through a phase of initial alloca-
tions over time, as has happened for example with Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the EU ETS.
Allowing permit allocations in period t+1 to partly depend on holdings at the end of
period t introduces complications to e¢ ciency properties of tradable permit markets, as
we have shown elsewhere (MacKenzie et al, 2008), which would be relevant to incentives
for lobbying on the part of individual rms.
Appendix A
Proof of derivation for regulators benchmark case:
Proof. For zero rent seeking activity, rm i objective function is:
i = p
(ai   ei )  ci(ei )
for optimal choices (ei ; a

i ). The social welfare function is:
max
~A
W =
nX
i=1
i  D(A)
Given that ai = A=N = ~A=N and
@A
@ ~A
= 1. The rst order condition is:
@i
@ ~A
=
@p
@ ~A
(ai   ei ) + p(1=N  
@e
@p
@p
@ ~A
)  @ci
@e
@e
@p
@p
@ ~A
which can be simplied by using (3) so that:
@i
@ ~A
=
@p
@ ~A
(ai   ei ) + p=N
Summing over all rms yields:
nX
i=1
@i
@ ~A
= p
Substituting into the regulators welfare function yields:
p = D0(A)
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Using (1) and (14), it is known that @A
@ ~A
= 1+S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

and substituting
(15) into (21) yields:
p
0@1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A (n  1)
n
p
[1 + "p]
1  p ~A
2 = D0(A)
0@1 + S
0@1 + [1 + "p]
1  p ~A

1A1A
rearranging yields:
p
26641  (n  1)n [1 + "p]
1 + S

1 + [1+"p]
(1 p ~A)

1  p ~A
2
3775 = D0(A)
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating (16) with respect to  yields:
dW
d
=
@W
@
+
@W
@ ~A
d ~A
d
where ~A is the optimally chosen allocation level given by Lemma 1. Given the Envelope
Theorem, this is simplied to
dW
d
=
@W
@

~A= ~A
where ~A is held xed at the regulators optimal level ~A. For the aggregate payo¤ for
rms:
@i
@
=
@p
@A
@A
@
(ai   ei ) + p(
@ai
@A
@A
@
  @e

@p
@p
@A
@A
@
)  @ci
@e
@e
@p
@p
@A
@A
@
which is simplied to:
@i
@
=
@p
@A
@A
@
(ai   ei ) + p
@ai
@A
@A
@
and summing over all rms:
nX
i=1
@i
@
= p
nX
i=1
@ai
@A
@A
@
= p
@A
@
which is substituted to yield:
dW
d
= p
@A
@
  @S

@
 D0(A)@A

@
and rearranging gives:
dW
d
= [p  D0(A)] @A

@
  @S

@
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